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a car is being used in the automobile business are increased, and
have permitted the insurer to limit the risk it desires to assume.
It should be observed that the exclusion forces the claimant to
rely on the service station's policy of insurance.
The construction of the clause "used in the automobile busi-
ness" by the court in the instant case appears sound. A service
station attendant or a mechanic driving a customer's automobile
to or from the customer is not using it in the sense in which a
demonstrator, tow truck, or parts-delivery vehicle is used. How-
ever, since the wording of the clause in question has been
changed in an attempt to avoid the result of the instant case,
some uncertainty will remain until the Louisiana Supreme
Court is presented with the problem of Dumas. As the decision
in Dumas was based on the fact that the work had been com-
pleted and the car was being returned, the question whether
there will be coverage under the new Family Policy if an acci-
dent occurs while the attendant is driving the vehicle to the
service station and before work is begun remains unanswered.
The court in Dumas indicated that the exclusionary clause ap-
plies only while the car is actually being serviced.17 Therefore,
since a vehicle being taken to the station is not actually being
serviced, the policy will probably afford coverage. The exclu-
sionary clause interpreted in the Nyman case has not been
changed, and the courts will probably follow Nyman when deal-
ing with a Standard Policy. If the Supreme Court adopts the
Dumas rule, an owned automobile would be covered by a Family
Policy but not by a Standard Policy under the facts of the in-
stant case. Such a result would be anomalous, since the inten-
tion of the parties under both policies is undoubtedly the same.
Raleigh Newman
INSURANCE - "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES - CONFLICT
BETWEEN ESCAPE CLAUSES AND EXCESS CLAUSES
An automobile liability insurance policy issued by State Farm
to Grigsby provided that coverage "with respect to a temporary
substitute auto or nonowned auto shall be excess insurance over
17. 181 So. 2d 841, 843 (1965): "We think it is abundantly clear under the
facts of the instant case that the exclusionary clause of the policy would have
applied to Waldrop service station manager who was driving the automobile at
the time of the accident] only while he was actually engaged in servicing the
Brady automobile."
NOTES
any other valid and collectible insurance." The insured automo-
bile was traded on a later model, and while awaiting delivery of
the new car Grigsby was given the use of another car by the
dealer. The dealer's liability policy, issued by Travelers, cov-
ered the substitute automobile, "but only if no other valid and
collectible auto liability insurance either primary or excess . . .
is available to such person." Each insurer denied liability on a
claim arising from an accident caused by Grigsby's negligence
and relied on the provisions of its policy and availability of in-
surance provided by the other. Held, the "other insurance"
clauses were mutually repugnant, so that each company is liable
in proportion to its respective policy limits. Stdte Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So. 2d 750 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1966), writs refused, 187 So. 2d 439 (1966).
"Other insurance" clauses are of three principal types: pro
rata clauses under which if there is other insurance the issuer
will be liable only for the proportion of the loss that represents
the ratio between his limit of liability and the total limit of lia-
bility of all insurance covering the loss; excess clauses, under
which if there is other insurance the issuer will be liable only
for the amount of loss that exceeds the limits of the other policy;
and escape clauses, under which if there is other insurance the
issuer is not liable at all.' Depending on the scope of their ex-
clusions, escape clauses may be classified as limited, meaning
they exclude coverage only when there exists other primary in-
surance, or unlimited, meaning coverage is excluded if there is
other insurance, primary or excess.
2
Most cases involving conflict between excess and escape
clauses are concerned with the limited escape clause. This con-
flict has usually been resolved by application of the principle that
the more specific clause should be given effect. Most courts have
found a limited escape clause provision for no protection when
there is "other valid and collectible insurance" less specific than
an excess clause stating "the insurance shall be excess insurance
1. Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 502 (1961).
2. A typical limited escape clause reads: "If any person, firm or corporation
other than the Named Assured has valid and collectible insurance against any
claim or loss, then such person, firm or corporation shall not be covered under
this Policy." Michigan Alkali Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 345,
347 (2d Cir. 1939). A typical "unlimited" escape clause defines an "insured"
as any person other than the named insured using the automobile with the
named insured's permission "but only if no other valid and collectible automobile
liability insurance either primary or excess . . . is available to such person."
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over any other valid and collectible insurance" and have held the
insurer on the policy containing the escape clause primarily
liable while giving full effect to the excess clause.3
Both the excess and limited escape clauses state, first, that
coverage is affected by "other valid and collectible insurance,"
and, second, what effect this "other valid and collectible insur-
ance" shall have on the particular policy. In the escape clause
it is provided that the effect is to end all coverage. In the ex-
cess clause it is stated that the effect is to render the policy only
excess insurance. The different effect in each clause is specifi-
cally set out. To say that one is more specific than the other is
arbitrary.4 The better method of settling this conflict between
an excess and a limited escape clause is to recognize that neither
takes precedence because of greater specificity, but that they are
mutually repugnant, and to hold each company for its pro rata
share.5
Conflict between an excess and an unlimited escape clause,
as in the instant case, requires a different analysis, however.
The unlimited escape clause specifically designates the other
types of insurance with which it might conflict and clearly states
that it shall not constitute other valid and collectible insurance
when one of the designated types of insurance is available. In a
conflict with an excess clause, which simply provides that cov-
erage shall be only for the excess if there is other valid and
collectible insurance, the more specific, unlimited escape provi-
sion should be given effect. This reasoning was applied in the
only previously reported case of conflict between an unlimited
escape clause and an excess clause. The unlimited escape clause
provided: "the insurance does not apply ... to any liability for
such loss as is covered on a primary, contributory, excess, or any
other basis by insurance in another insurance company." The
Florida court gave effect to the unlimited escape clause, saying
it prevented the policy that contained it from constituting other
valid and collectible insurance under the less specific excess
3. Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941)
Michigan Alkali Co. v. Bankers Indem. Ins. Co., 103 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1939)
Continental Cas. Co. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 94 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1938) ; Travelers
Indem. Co. v. State Auto. Ins. Co., 67 Ohio App. 457, 21 Ohio Op. 427, 37 N.E.2d
198 (1941) ; Grasberger v. Liebert & Obert, 335 Pa. 491, 6 A.2d 925 (1939). See
generally 7 AM. JuR. 2d Auto Ins. § 202, at 545 (1963).
4. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958, 960
(9th Cir. 1952).
5. Gilkey v. Andrew Weir Ins. Co., 291 F.2d 132 (9th Cir. 1961); Oregon
Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 195 P.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952).
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clause and held the excess clause insurer primarily liable., This
case also specifically upheld the validity of an unlimited escape
clause despite a contention that it was against public policy. The
Louisiana courts have held that no standard form is required
by statute for automobile liability insurance as such, and that
limited coverage in an automobile liability policy is not pro-
hibited.7
Although the instant case involved a conflict between an
excess clause and an unlimited escape clause, the court decided
the case as if dealing with a limited escape clause. The court
resolved the conflict between the two clauses by saying:
"[T]here is no real difference between the quoted provisions
of the policies. Actually, the insurance afforded by one of
these policies is not any more available to the insured than
is the insurance provided by the other .... The excess insur-
ance clause in the State Farm policy and the other insur-
ance or escape clause in the Travelers policy are mutually
repugnant . . . and . . . insofar as the claim in this case is
concerned those provisions of the policies are ineffective.",,
The court cited three cases to support its decision, but none in-
volved the type of conflict the court had before it.9
6. Continental Cas. Co. v. Weekes, 74 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1954) ; and see Annot.,
46 A.L.R.2d 1168 (1956).
7. Kennedy v. Audubon Ins. Co., 82 So. 2d 91 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
This case interpreted LA. R.S. 22:623 (1950), which sets out general rules per-
taining to standard provisions of insurance contracts.
8. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So. 2d 750,
751 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
9. Two of the cases cited, Bradshaw v. St. Paul & ,larine Ins. Co., 226 F.
Supp. 569 (N.D. Ga. 1964), and Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 209 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. W. Va. 1962), involved a conflict between
identical excess clauses. Both courts held them -to be repugnant and held each
company liable on a pro rata basis. It is clear that these two clauses were repug-
nant, but the cases are not authority in the instant case which involved a con-
flict between an excess clause and an unlimited escape clause. For cases of con-
flict between two excess clauses, see Continental Cas. Co. v. Buckeye Union
Cas. Co., 143 N.E.2d 169 (Ohio 1957); Annot., 7 Am. Jul. 2d Automobile In-
surance § 202, at 544 (1963).
The third case, Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,
195 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952), invlved a conflict between aln excess chiuse
and a limited escape clause, so it should not govern the instant case. The differ-
ence in wording of the limited escape clause in Oregon and the unlimited escape
clause in the instant case would call for a different decision.
In four Louisiana cases effect was given to excess clauses, but it appears
from the facts that the other policies in those cases contained no "other in-
surance" clauses of any kind. Benroth v. Continental Cas. Co., 132 F. Supp. 270
(W.D. La. 1955); Peterson v. Armstrong, 176 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965); O'Brien v. Traders Gen. Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1961); Hurdle v.'State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 63 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1961). One Louisiana case involved two pro rata clauses, and the court
held the two companies liable pro rata. Hospital Service Dist. No. 1 of Plaque-
mine Parish v. Delta Gas, 171 So. 2d 293 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
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The court failed to give effect to the clear statement in Trav-
elers' escape clause that the policy would not constitute "other
valid and collectible insurance" when it conflicted with insur-
ance of either excess or primary type. No language in State
Farm's excess policy was specific enough to counteract this pro-
vision. In failing to apply the more specific "unlimited" escape
clause the court failed to follow the Civil Code provision that
every part of the agreement must be given effect.10
When the economic intent of the unlimited escape clause is
considered, it becomes obvious that the clauses used in the two
policies were not considered repugnant by the framers. Not only
were the clauses different, but two completely different kinds
of policy were involved. The policy issued by State Farm was
a family coverage policy. Travelers' policy was a garage liabil-
ity policy" designed to afford garage owners, car dealers, car
lessors, and other mass lenders of automobiles cheaper insurance
coverage. The unlimited escape clause was to exclude liability
on any basis for personal injury or property damage when there
exists any other insurance, either primary or excess. 2 Because
of this clause, a 5 per cent reduction in personal injury and prop-
erty damage rates was allowed by the Casualty and Surety Divi-
sion of the Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission.13 The rat-
ing commission evidently considered that in case of conflict be-
tween the unlimited escape clause and any clause in other in-
surance the unlimited escape clause would be given effect.
The decision in the instant case seems attributable to the
court's failure to distinguish between the unlimited escape clause
with which it was dealing and the limited escape clause consid-
ered in most prior decisions. Since this unlimited escape clause
was more specific than those others, it was not repugnant to the
excess clause. The excess clause insurer should have been held
10. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1945 (1870) : "Legal agreements having the effects
of law upon the parties, none but the parties can abrogate or modify them.
Upon this principle are established the following rules:
"Second-That courts are bound to give legal effect to all such contracts
according to the true intent of all the parties;
"Third-That the intent is to be determined by the words of the contract,
when these are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences .... "
Id. art. 1955: "All clauses of agreements are interpreted the one .by the other,
giving to each the sense that results from the entire act."
11. 7 CAS. & SUR. REV. 3 (Sept. 30, 1963).
12. The unlimited escape clause is put in a policy by Endorsement A782.




primarily liable because by the very terms of the unlimited es-
cape clause the policy containing it could not constitute other
valid and collectible insurance. Such a holding would have been
consistent with the understanding and clear intent of the Louisi-
ana Insurance Rating Commission.
Jarrell E. Godfrey, Jr.
JUDICIAL SALES - THE PUBLIC RECORDS DOCTRINE'S EFFECT
ON RADICAL NULLITIES
Plaintiff, a posthumous child born in 1941, brought a petitory
action in 1963 to recover his forced portion of his father's suc-
cession. He sought to set aside the 1940 succession sale of the
immovable property of the estate, alleging that his co-heirs
fraudulently had the property appraised at less than one-half
its value and purchased it for less than two-thirds the appraised
value. The co-heirs and bona fide third-party purchasers of some
of the property were joined as defendants. The trial court sus-
tained defendants' exception of five-year curative prescription
applied to judicial sales by Civil Code article 3543.1 On appeal,
held, reversed. Since the property was sold not only for less than
two-thirds its appraised value, but also for less than its actual
value, the succession sale was an absolute nullity. Prescription
under article 3543 was not available even to subsequent pur-
chasers for it was apparent in the public records that a just
price had not been obtained. Bordelon v. Bordelon, 180 So. 2d
855 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
Louisiana has effected a blend of Anglo-American and civil
law in dealing with errors in judicial sales. The doctrine of
informality, as opposed to radical error, is a common-law con-
cept used to protect the stranger who purchases at a judicial
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3543 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1932, No. 231;
La. Acts 1960, No. 407, § 1. All informalities of legal procedure connected with
or growing out of any sale at public auction or at private sale of real or personal
property made by any sheriff of the parishes of this state, licensed auctioneer, or
other persons authorized by an order of the courts of this state, to sell at public
auction or at private sale, shall be prescribed against those claiming under such
sale that the lapse of two years from the time of making said sale, except where
minors or interdicted persons were owners or part ownership by said minor or
interdicted persons, the prescription thereon shall accrue after five years from the
date of public adjudication or private sale thereof.
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